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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case

This case is an attempt by Wesley and Lamon Gentillon (the Partnership) to enforce an
Agreement for Exchange of Property and Option (the 1998 Agreement) against Marcel and Doris
Gentillon (the Gentillons) and their son, Scott Gentillon. The 1998 Agreement included
provisions for the Gentillons to deed certain farm property to the Partnership pursuant to a future
survey to determine the properties location and legal description. The parties to the 1998
Agreement did not follow through with the anticipated surveyor preparation of the anticipated
deeds. In 2006, the Gentillons sold their land, which included property referenced in the 1998
Agreement to Craig and Janice Peterson (the Petersons). The Petersons filed an action to quit
title to the property against the Partnership. The Partnership filed an answer and a third party
complaint against the Gentillons seeking $200,000 of monetary damages for breach of contract of
the 1998 Agreement and specific performance of the 1998 Agreement. It also included a claim
for unjust enrichment. The Partnership was later granted leave to amend its third party complaint
to allege the existence of a resulting trust. The district court ruled against the Partnership on all
counts, except that it did find a resulting trust existed over a small portion of the property
necessary for the passage of a center pivot that irrigates the Partnership's adjoining land.

h.

Proceedings Below

The Petersons complained against the Partnership seeking to quiet title to the disputed
property and eject the Partnership. R. at 15-21. They also asserted causes of action for trespass
and an injunction regarding use of the disputed property. The Partnership answered the
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complaint, counter claimed to quiet title, and brought a third party complaint against Marcel and
Doris Gentillon and Scott and Tracy Gentillon. 1 R. at 22-40. The third party complaint sought
damages of $200,000 for breach of contract, specific performance of the 1998 Agreement,
included a claim for unjust enrichment, and a request for attorney's fees pursuant to the attorney
fee clause of the 1998 Agreement. R. at 28-33. The Gentillons answered the third party
complaint and asserted various affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations. R. at
46-50. The parties filed various summary judgment motions and the trial court made several
rulings on summary judgment. The court ruled that the Petersons' were not bona fide purchasers.
R. at 304-306. The court granted the Gentillons summary judgment on the breach of contract,
specific performance, and unjust enrichment claims based on the running of the statute of
limitations. R. at 250-259; 535-539. The Partnership requested leave to amend their complaint
to allege the existence of a resulting trust. R. at 206. Although the court initially denied the
motion, R. at 251-252, it was eventually granted. R. at 301-302. The Partnership filed their
Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint adding a claim of resulting trust. R.
at 492-510. The Gentillons answered the amended third party complaint. R. at 512-517. The
court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a resulting trust,
R. at 539-542, and a held a bench trial on October 20-21,2009. On January 7, 2010, the court
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. R. at 564-573. The trial court ruled
that a resulting trust existed on behalf of the Partnership with respect to that portion of the SW

ITracy Gentillon filed a pro se answer denying all allegations and any knowledge or
connection to the matter except her former marriage to Scott Gentillon. She has not taken part in
any ofthe subsequent proceedings. R. at 44.
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comer of T-10032 necessary allow passage of the pivot circle. Id. It ruled that there was no
intention on the part ofthe Gentillons to hold any additional land for the benefit of the Petersons
and that the remainder of T-10032 and all of Lot 1, Section 19, was to remain with the Petersons.
Id. The court ordered a survey to provide the legal descriptions necessary for it to issue judicial
deeds consistent with its opinion. R. at 572-573. In the process of obtaining that survey, the
parties discovered that the southern property line of T-10032 bisected the house formerly
occupied by Marcel and Doris Gentillon and that a portion of the house along with the front yard
and garden area (collectively referred to as the "garden spot" or "garden plot") was located
outside of the lot on property owned by the Partnership. At a hearing held November 22, 2010,
the parties stipulated that they would be allowed to amend their complaints to address solely the
issue ofthe garden spot and the court entered a order consistent with that. R. at 618. The
Petersons filed an amended complaint adding Count 4 specific performance of warranty deed that
directly addressed the house. R. at 608. The Partnership file an Answer to Supplemental
Complaint. R. at 612-615. The Gentillons answered the Petersons claim for specific
performance and filed a cross claim requesting the 1991 deed be reformed, and asserting title to
the property under the theories of adverse possession, resulting trust, estoppel, and alternatively,
claiming unjust enrichment. R. at 629-637. The Partnership replied the Gentillons' cross claim.
R. at 620-627. The court held a supplemental trial on December 23, 2010. On February 10,
2011, the court issued its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Following
Bench Trial. R. at 666-676. The trial court determined that the garden plot would be deeded to
the Petersons. R. at 674. The Petersons and the Gentillons moved the court for costs and fees.
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R. at 691, 720. The Partnership opposed the motions. R. at 730-738. The trial court heard

argument on various motions to amend the motion for costs and fees and issued its Opinion and
Order and Motion to Amend and Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs on April 27, 2011. R. at
770-776. The court declined to make any findings to clarify its decision on the garden spot,
named the Petersons as the sole prevailing party, and declined to award attorney fees to any
party. Id. The Partnership timely appealed the trial court's decision. The Gentillons cross
appealed on the issue of prevailing party status and attorney fees.

c.

Factual Background

Prior to 1991 Marcel and Doris Gentillon owned and farmed all of the property at issue in
this case. Tr. 424:7-426:23. In 1991, Marcel and Doris sold the farm to their son Scott
Gentillon. Id. At that time the parcel identified as T-10032 and also referred to as "the home
place" was separated from the rest of the farm. Id. Although no one knew it at the time, the legal
description in the 1991 deed creating T-10032 was faulty - its west boundary line bisected the
Gentillons home and part ofthe home along with the home's garden spot was outside of the
parcel and included in the property deeded to Scott. R. Ex. A at 44, 45. The Gentillons
continued to occupy the house and garden spot until 2006 when they sold the property to the
Petersons. Tr. 314-319. During that time the Gentillons paid taxes on their deeded property. Tr.
442:13-461:18; R. Ex. A at 84-90. The entirety ofthe house as well as one acre of improved
ground was taxed with the Gentillons parcel. Id.
In 1998 Scott Gentillon elected to sell the farm. R. at 267:7-8. Marcel Gentillon
preferred that the property be kept in the family and suggested that Scott sell it to Marcel's
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nephews, Wesley Gentillon and Lamon Gentillon (generally referred to as "Mont and Wes" or
"the Partnership"). Tr. 267:6-22. The Partnership desired to buy the farm and wanted to be able
to place an irrigation pivot on the property at a future time. Tr. 135:1-11.
The parties met with an attorney who worked for Idaho Supreme, who was financing the
sale for the Partnership. Tr. at 267:25-268:14. The attorney had an agreement prepared when
they arrived. Tr. 267:23-269:7. However, when the parties learned that Marcel owned a parcel
of ground in the south eastern comer of the farm near the river - referred to as Lot 16 or the
"riparian ground"- and that that parcel would cause a problem with the future installation of a
pivot, the attorney redrafted the agreement on the spot. Id. No other attorneys were consulted.
Id. All of the parties signed the 1998 Agreement at that meeting. Id. However, they did not
understand the contents ofthe Agreement. Scott understood that he was trading Lot 1 of Section
19, which he owned, for Lot 16, the riparian ground, which Marcel owned. Tr.306:10-24;
285:8-25. At the same time, Marcel and Doris did not even recall that they had deeded Lot 1 of
Section 19 to Scott and thought they still owned it. Tr. 55:24-56:14; 43:12-46:21; 66:20-67:23;
234:3-18. The members of the Partnership did not understand that they were not receiving all of
the anticipated property at that time and did not understand that any additional land exchanges
would be necessary. Tr. 187:19-188:18. At the meeting where the 1998 Agreement was signed,
Marcel deeded Lot 16 to Scott by warranty deed, and Scott deeded Lot 1 to Marcel by warranty
deed. R. Ex. A at 72-75.
The 1998 Agreement is in the record at Exhibit A, pages 47-50, and "Exhibit A" to the
Agreement, map/sketch of the parcels involved, is included in the record at Exhibit A, page 60.
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As written, the 1998 Agreement anticipated that Marcel would convey to the Partnership
an unidentified portion of the SW corner T-10032 "necessary to install a pivot" in return for
unidentified land "east of the pivot contiguous to Parcel-T0032, least disruptive to farming
patterns". R. Ex. A at 48

~

3. The agreement also states that "Wes and Mont will pay for the

Survey to obtain the legal descriptions for the land to be exchanged." Id. Regarding Lot 1 and
Lot 16 the Agreement states as follows:
If survey ( sic) shows that the farmable acreage in Lot 16 is more than 10% (sic)
less than the farmable acreage in Lot 1, Marcel agree (sic) to deed to Wes and
Mont land to adjust the new south boundary in Lot 1 (by moving a line parallel to
the south line of T-10032 north or south) so that the farmable acreage in Marcel's
retained portion of Lot 1 equals the farmable acreage in Section 16 (sic).
Id.

~

4. The 1998 Agreement contained an attorney fee clause as follows:
Attorney's Fees: In the event of any action being necessary to enforce any of the
terms hereof, arising from the breach of any provision hereof, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to receive from the other, all costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such
claim is litigated, and including fees in bankruptcy court or fees on appeal.

Id. ~ 9. No survey to determine the "farmable acreage" of Lot 16 or Lot 1 was ever done. Tr.
354: 14-1 7. After the meeting, none of the parties referenced the 1998 Agreement again until
2006 when the Gentillons sold their property to the Petersons. Tr. 189:24-190:4; 271 :24-272:6.
In January 1999 Darren Leavitt, who is a surveyor and Marcel Gentillon's son in law, and
friendly with all the parties of the action, did a survey regarding the property. R. at 330-31, 8: 19:3. He spoke with both Marcel and Partnership, although not at the same time. The
conversations took place over several months. R. at 341, 51 :4-20. The Partnership was
interested in determining whether a irrigation pivot would fit on the property and, although it did
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not actually retain him, they asked Mr. Leavitt to check. R. at 339-340,44:22-46:21; Tr. 136: 13137:15. Mr. Leavitt did not have or reference the 1998 Agreement while he was doing his survey
work. R. at 336,31 :22-24. The Leavitt survey differs substantially from the survey anticipated
by the 1998 Agreement. Darren Leavitt made no attempt to calculate "farmable acreage", but
simply relied on deeded legal descriptions. Tr. 209:22-211 :24. The Leavitt survey did not
identify the property actually necessary for the installation of the pivot.. It merely estimated the
location of a potential pivot. R. at 343, 57: 17-60:8. In fact, no pivot was put in place until 2004.
Tr. 146:4-11. While doing his work, Mr. Leavitt discovered that the west boundary line ofT10032 bisected the Gentillon's house. Tr.433:12-435:6. Mr. Leavitt understood that everyone
had agreed that the Gentillons would retain the house and garden spot and included that in his
survey. Id. When the partnership was modifying the irrigation system, it took into account the
Gentillon's ownership of the garden spot. Tr. 124: 13-20. Mr. Leavitt's survey was not recorded.
R. at 385. No party took any further action to prepare any deeds, legal descriptions, or transfer

any land subsequent to Mr. Leavitt's preliminary survey.
In 2003 or 2004 Marcel Gentillon built a fence to contain horses on the south portion of
his property. Tr. 314: 18-316: 1O. The fence was built where he ran out of grass seed to seed his
pasture. Id.
In 2006 the Gentillons entered into a purchase and sale agreement with the Petersons to
sell them their home and land. R. Ex. A at 4-5. The agreement allowed them to stay in their
home for a time their new home was finished. Id. The Gentillons transferred title to the
Petersons by warranty deed to their home place (T-10032) and all oflot 1 of section 19. R. Ex. A
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at 6-8. At the time of the sale Marcel and Doris Gentillon affirmed that they had no knowledge
of any lot line disputes, encroachments, easements, or right of ways affecting the property. R.
Ex. A at 65. Marcel Gentillon is Janice Peterson's uncle. Tr.73:17-24. At no time in the
process of selling the property the Petersons did Marcel or Doris Gentillon mention the existence
of the 1989 Agreement or the Partnership's alleged right to the disputed property. Tr. 80:2382: 1. After the sale the Petersons discovered that the Partnership was farming a portion of their
property and commissioned a survey to determine their actual property lines. Tr. 93:3-94:7.
After receiving the completed survey, Mr. Peterson attempted to discuss the matter with the
Partnership, and this litigation ensued. Tr. 96:4-97: 18.
2. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

a.

Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Partnership's action for
specific performance of a contract was barred by the statute of limitations
when the Partnership took no action to enforce the contract until 8 years
after the cause of action accrued?

b.

Whether the district correctly declined to apply a resulting trust to the
property over which the Partnership's pivot did not pass when the
Partnership failed to show clear, cogent, and convincing evidence an intent to
create a trust?

c.

Whether the district court erred in not naming Gentillons a prevailing party
and awarding them costs and fees when they avoided all liability on the
Partnership's third-party claim, prevailed on their very limited counter
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claim, and the contract the Partnership was attempting to enforce contained
an attorney's fees clause?
d.

Whether Gentillons are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C.
12-120(3) and the terms of the Agreement for Exchange of Property and
Option?
3. ARGUMENT

The trial court correctly ruled that specific performance, as a remedy for breach of
contract is barred by the statute of limitations. The Partnership's attempt to rely on Love v.
Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 (1871), is unpersuasive as Love states the well know rule regarding the

accrual of a cause of action for a resulting trust, which the trial court applied. The trial court's
finding that the Partnership failed to show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence an intent to
create a trust except as to the property necessary for the passage of the pivot is supported by
substantial and competent evidence. However, the trial court erred in not naming the Gentilons
as the prevailing party on the Partnership's third party claim and not awarding them costs and
fees pursuant to the 1998 Agreement and I. C. 12-120(3).

a.

Standard of Review
1.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). Where the
parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and
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theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would
preclude the Court from entering summary judgment. McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 923,88
P.3d 740, 742 (2004) (Citing Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp.,
136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921,923 (2001). However, the mere fact that both parties move for
summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. Id The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not
change the applicable standard of review, and the Court must evaluate each party's motion on its
own merits. Id
When an action, as here, will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the
trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed
evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences. P.G. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237,159
P.3d 870,874 (2007) (citing Intermountain Forest Management, 136 Idaho at 235,31 P.3d at
923). Resolution of the possible conflict between the inferences is within the responsibilities of
the fact finder. Id (citing Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997).
11.

Court Trial Standard

This Court reviews a district court's bench trial decisions to determine "whether the
evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of
law." Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409,413
(2006). This Court will set aside findings of fact only when clearly erroneous. Id. The Court
will not disturb findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, "even if the evidence
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is conflicting." ld "It is the province of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and
testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Thorn Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 137
Idaho 480,484,50 P.3d 975, 979 (2002). The Court liberally construes a trial court's findings
"in favor of the judgment entered." ld. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court
freely reviews matters of law. ld.

b.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Partnership's
claim for breach of contract, and all remedies for that breach, because the
contract was barred by the statute of limitations.

The trial court correctly found that I.C. § 5-216 provides the appropriate statute of
limitations for the breach of contract and specific performance claims. R. at 256-257, 535-536.
That statute provides in relevant part as follows:
Within five (5) years: an action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing.
The statute includes all obligations or liabilities founded upon an instrument in writing. The
Partnership's specific performance claim asserts that Gentillons had a obligation to deed certain
real property to it based on the terms of the Agreement for Exchange of Property and Option. R.
at 31.
Pursuant to I.C. § 5-201 the five year period began to run when the cause of action
accrued. An action is accrued when one party may sue another. Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103
Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119,122 (Ct. App. 1982). As the district court held, assuming the
Partnership ever had a valid cause of action, it was entitled to bring an action requiring the
specific performance of the Agreement in January 1999 when, subsequent to the Agreement
being signed, the sale of the property to the Partnership, the survey by Leavitt, the Gentillons
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failed to provide the deeds to the disputed property. R. at 256-258, 535-536. The district court
correctly held that all causes of action founded upon the Agreement and Exchange for Property
were barred by I.C. § 5-216.

c.

The Partnership's assertion that Love v. Watkins supports specific
performance of the contract is incorrect - Love is an example of a resulting
trust case and the trial court applied the rule expressed in love in
determining that the statute of limitations for a resulting trust had not
expired.

The Partnership argues that Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 (1871), supports the proposition
that the district court erred by ruling that the statute of limitations on the Partnership's breach of
contract claim had run and declining to specifically enforce the Agreement for Exchange of
Property and Option. However, Love is an example of a resulting trust case, not a breach of
contract case. Love supports the district court's holding that the statute oflimitations on a
resulting trust case does not begin to run until the trustee takes an action repudiating the trust.
Numerous California cases analyze Love as a resulting trust case. Groteftnd v. May, 33 Cal.App.
321,326, 165 P. 27, 29 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1917); Scadden Flat Gold Min. Co. v. Scadden, 121
Cal. 33, 39, 53 P. 440, 442 - 443 (Ca1.l898); Plass v. Plass, 122 Cal. 3,16,54 P. 372, 377
(Ca1.1898); Andrews v. Rio Grande Live Stock Co., 120 P. 31 1,313 (N.M.Terr. 1911). This rule
is well known, was recognized and followed by they district court. R. at 541-542. The
California court's holding in Love is entirely consistent with the district court's rulings.
Although distinguishing between an equitable remedy of specific performance to a breach
of contract claim and the equitable remedy of resulting trust may appear unimportant, it has
substantial practical implications. The district court determined that because the statute of
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limitations on the contract had run, it could not enforce the contract, but rather, would view the
contract as evidence of the agreement creating the alleged resulting trust. R. at 673. This
allowed the court also view other evidence of the parties intentions, not just the terms of the
contract..

d.

Alternatively, even if the district court had erred in determining the
Partnership's claim for specific performance was barred by the statute of
limitations, the Partnership's claim for specific performance must fail as the
1998 Agreement does not identify the property to be exchanged.

The district court granted summary judgment on the Partnership's claim of specific
performance based on the running of the statute of limitations. R. at 535-536. However, even if
this Court were to find that the statute of limitations had not run, the Partnership cannot obtain
specific performance of the 1998 Agreement because it does not identifY the property to be
transferred. The 1998 Agreement anticipates the possible exchange of property pursuant to a
survey to determine "farmable acreage" which was never performed - as such it violates the
statute of frauds. "Agreements for the sale of real property that fail to comply with the statute of
frauds are unenforceable for obtaining specific performance or damages." Hoffman v. S V Co.,
102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981). This Court has previously held that the
requirements of the statute of frauds are not met by references to a survey yet to be conducted.
Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlem ire , 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 (2004); White

v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1,644 P.2d 323 (1982). Even if the Partnership were to argue that the part
performance exception to the statute of frauds applied, the 1998 Agreement still could not be
specifically enforced because "[t]o specifically enforce a contract to sell real property by
operation of the doctrine of part performance, the agreement must be complete, definite, and
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certain in all its tenns, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to
certainty." Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 92,233 P.3d 18,
23 (2008). Because the 1998 Agreement provides no legal description and the property to be
exchanged is contingent on a survey that was never perfonned, it is not possible for a court to
require specific perfonnance, even if it were not barred by the statute of limitations.
e.

The district court correctly declined to apply the doctrine of a resulting trust
to any portion of the property except the portion over which the
Partnership's pivot passed over because the Partnership failed to show
resulting trust by clear cogent and convincing evidence.
1.

The trial court's findings regarding resulting trust are reviewed for
substantial and competent evidence.

The Partnership suggests that the trial court, in analyzing the existence of a resulting trust,
was engaged in the interpretation of a contract, that standard contract interpretation rules apply,
and that as such, this Court reviews the trial court's findings regarding the resulting trust as a
question of law. App. Br. 22-26. That is not correct. The trial court's ruling that the Gentillons
did not intend to hold property in trust for the Partnership is a finding of fact. As such, it will not
be disturbed if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Herman ex reI. Herman v.
Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 785-786,41 P.3d 209,213 - 214 (2002).
11.

Standard ofprooffor a resulting trust.

The party asserting the existence of a resulting trust bears an unusually high burden.
"Generally an alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust is required to show by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence the underlying facts necessary to give rise to resulting trust." Herman ex reI.
Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 786, 41 P.3d 209, 214 (2002) (citing Shurrum v. Watts, 80
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Idaho 44,53,324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958)); See also Bogert's Trusts And Trustees § 464 (Quantum
of evidence required). The district court correctly ruled that the Partnership did not present facts
that showed an intent on the part of the parties to create a resulting trust except as to the land
directly under the pivot.
iii.

Partnership is misusing the resulting trust doctrine to attempt to enforce
an unenforceable contract.

The 1998 Agreement contemplated the possible transfer of an unknown and unidentified
quantity of land, at a future unknown time. As such, it could not have been enforced as a
contract for the sale of land. Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87,
233 P.3d 18 (2008); White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1,644 P.2d 323 (1982). The Partnerships is now
attempting to use the doctrine of resulting trust to enforce the Agreement - something they could
not have done under a contract theory. Even if we were to disregard the insufficiency of the
description of property, the Agreement makes the transfer contingent on the completion of a
survey, which the Partnership was to pay for, that was never completed. In addition to the
unenforceability of the Agreement on its face and the lack of the required survey, the Partnership
delayed enforcing the Agreement until all applicable statute of limitations had run. The
Partnership should not be allowed to use a resulting trust to enforce a document that was at all
times unenforceable.
IV.

The Partnership failed to provide clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
of the intent to create a trust.

The intent of the parties is central to an inquiry regarding the existence of a purchase
money resulting trust. A respected treatise on trusts and trustees explains as follows:
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This resulting trust depends for its existence on the actual intent of the creator,
expressed in acts other than writing or the spoken word. The conduct of the payor
with reference to the price and deed lead the court to infer an intent to have a trust
for himself. The theory of enforcement is that of carrying out the intent of the
settlor, just as truly as if he had reduced his trust to writing and inserted it in the
deed. Resulting trusts are "intent enforcing" just as much as are the usual express
trusts. They bear little or no relationship to constructive trusts, which do not arise
out of intent but depend for their existence on the wrongful conduct of the
defendant which induces a court to adjudge him a trustee.

Bogert's Trusts And Trustees § 454. In Shurrum the Court clearly explained the relationship
between the parties intent and the existence of a resulting trust as follows:
As a general rule, a resulting trust arises only where such may reasonably be
presumed to be the intention of the parties as determined from the facts and
circumstances existing at the time of the transaction. Smith v. Smith, 143 Fla. 159,
196 So. 409; Sands v. Church of the Ascension, etc., 181 Md. 536, 30 A.2d 771;
Baskett v. Crook, 86 Cal.App.2d 355, 195 P.2d 39; 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 102 b, p.
947. In Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash.2d 345,196 P.2d 835, 840, the rule is stated:
the whole doctrine of resulting trusts is founded upon the principle
of a presumed intention to create a trust, and where the facts and
circumstances are such as reasonably indicate an absence of such
intention or indicate a contrary intention the principle should not be
applied.'

Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 53,324 P.2d 380,385 (1958). The trial court specifically found
that no such intent existed except as to that portion of the southwest comer ofT-I0032 necessary
for the passage of the pivot. R. at 674. The trial court's decision is supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
The terms of the Agreement for Exchange of Property and Option, upon which the
Partnership relies to show intent, support the district court's ruling. Section 4 ofthe Agreement
reads as follows:
If survey shows that the farmable acreage in Lot 16 is more than 10% less than the
farmable acreage in Lot 1, Marcel agree [sic] to deed to Wes and Mont land to adjust the new
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south boundary in Lot 1 (by moving a line parallel to the south line ofT-10032 north or south) so
that the farmable acreage in Marcels retained portion of Lot 1 equals the farmable acreage in
Section 16.
R. Ex. A at 101. The transfer of portions of Lot 1 were not certain, they were contingent on the

outcome of survey which was never performed. As noted by the district court at trial and
admitted by the Partnership, no determination of farmable acreage was ever undertaken. Tr. 296297; 354:14-17; 343:19-22; 211:8-24.
Equally important is the lack of understanding by any of the parties to the 1998
Agreement regarding its terms. No one who signed the 1998 agreement knew what was in it, and
none made any attempt to abide by its terms or even refer to it. The 1998 Agreement was drafted
and signed by an attorney who worked for the party financing the sale, Idaho Supreme, during
one meeting between the parties. Tr. 267:23-270:4. No one involved can remember ever
referencing the 1998 Agreement again. Tr. 189:24-190:4; 271 :24-272:6.
Scott Gentillon testified that the Agreement as drafted by the attorney and signed by the
parties in 1998 was not consistent with his understanding of the parties agreement - he
understood the swap to be a trade of his Lot 16 for his father's Lot 1 and did not believe that
there were to be any adjustments to Lot 1. Tr. 306: 10-24; 285:8-25. Marcel and Doris Gentillon
testified that in 1998, at the time the Agreement for Exchange of Property and Option was
signed, they believed they owned Lot 1, not Scott. Tr. 55:24-56:14; 43:12-46:21; 66:20-67:23;
234:3-18. As such, Marcel and Doris could not have intended to swap property they already
believed they owned for other property they owned. Marcel testified that after the agreement was
completed that he had no further conversations with the Partnership regarding the Agreement.
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Tr. 323 :20-324:2. He also testified that he was aware that the Partnership was farming a portion
of property that was in his name, but that he was simply "accommodating them" and had no idea
that they would make a claim of ownership to a portion of the property. Tr. 324:3-325: 11. He
testified that he did not believe he agreed to "equally exchange acreage" but just to give up Lot
16. Tr. 330: 16-331: 16. Lamon Gentillon testified that he had no idea that there were additional
deeds that need to be exchanged after the agreement was signed and that he understood that they
had "signed what we bought". Tr. 187:19-188:18. Wesley Gentillon testified that he had no
recollection of having taken any action to have the survey referenced in the 1998 Agreement
performed or paid for. Tr. 263:2-18. The Partnership's behavior, in not taking any action
regarding a survey, obtaining legal descriptions, or even discussing the matter with the Gentillons
indicates that they did not understand that they were to receive additional property than what was
delivered to them on closing with Scott.
v.

The Partnership has failed to show the creation of a purchase money
resulting trust because it has failed to provide any evidence that it payed
for the disputed property.

The Partnership is alleging a purchase money resulting trust. Purchase money resulting
trusts arise when a party pays the purchase price for property but the property is titled in the name
of another. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 470,886 P.2d 772, 775 (1994); Bogert's Trusts

And Trustees § 454. However, the Partnership failed to present any evidence that it paid for the
property in dispute. The Agreement mentions the Partnership's desire to buy Scott's farm. R.
Ex. A at 47. However, it makes no mention of a price. It does not indicate how or when the
Partnership would pay for the undetermined portion of Lot 1 the Gentillons were to deed to the
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Partnership. At trial, Scott Gentillon testified that the sale of his farm to the Partnership actually
included two separate parcels - the parcel near Marcel and Doris Gentillon's home, which
included about 68 acres, and the parcel near Mont's home, which was approximately 42-46
acres. 2 Tr. 272:7-274:8. Scott testified that he and his wife asked for $2,000 per acre, but that
the final purchase price was $200,000 for all of Scott's farm ground which came to about 110112 acres. Tr. 272:7-274:8. Scott testified that, to his recollection, the $200,000 price was
arrived at by the attorney working for the company financing the Partnership's purchase, and that
that was all "they were going to pay." Tr. 273:24-274:8. At trial, the Partnership was unable to
identifY what amount, if any, it paid for the property referenced in the 1998 Agreement. Tr.
190:5-192:6. Lamon Gentillon testified that the price of $200,000 was set by Scott. Tr. 191:24192: 1. The Partnership failed to provide any evidence that the land swap anticipated by the 1998
Agreement was considered when setting the purchase price for Scott's farm or that it ever
provided payment of any kind for the property in dispute.
f.

The trial court correctly awarded the "garden spot" to the Petersons.

Subsequent to the supplemental trial regarding the garden spot, the trial court ruled that
"[t]he 'garden plot' shall also be deeded to and title thereto quieted in the Petersons" R. at 674.
The trial court reiterated its position in response to a motion to amend. R. at 774. The trial
court's decision to award Petersons the garden spot is correct based on two distinct basis. First,
Gentillons adversely posse sed that portion of the home an garden spot west of their property line

2The parcel near Mont's house is not shown on any maps and, beyond its impact on the
purchase price of the transaction, has no relevance to this case.
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in 1996, and second, alternatively, the property was held in trust for Gentillons either since the
error in the 1991 deed, or since the discovery of the error in 1999.
1.

The garden spot was adversely possessed by the Gentillons in 1996.

Prior to 1991 the home and garden area was not separated from the rest of Marcel and
Doris Gentillon's farm land now owned by the Partnership. Tr. 426:10-20. In 1991, when
Marcel and Doris sold the farm to Scott Gentillon, the parcel referred to as T -10032, or the
homestead, was separated from the rest of the farm. Id Pursuant to the deed creating T-10032,
its western property line bisected Marcel and Doris's home and their yard and garden spot were
west ofthe property line. R. Ex. A at 44; Tr. 367:15-23; 434:18-22. The error in the deed was
unknown until 1999 when Darren Leavitt preformed a survey of the area. Tr. 427:14-23.
However, by that time the property had already been adversely possessed by Marcel and Doris
Gentillon. By continuing to use the garden spot as their yard and garden, Marcel and Doris
Gentillon openly asserted ownership of it adverse to Scott Gentillon, who owned the farm and to
the Partnership, who leased the farm from Scott for this period. Between 1991, when the
property was split off and January 1999, when Darren Leavitt discovered the incorrect property
line, Marcel and Doris Gentillon obtained title to the property by adverse possession.
Idaho Code § 5-210 requires the payment of taxes in order to adversely posses property.
Marcel and Doris paid taxes on the entire house as well as on one acre of improved land
surrounding the horne. Tr. 452:13-461: 18. The location of this one acre of improved land was
not identified, but it was taxed at a much higher rate than the other 7.48 acres in the lot. R. Ex. A
at 84-85; Tr. 455:1-11; 457:3-13; 461:10-18. It was shown that improvements, such as a home
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and yard are taxed at a higher rate than bare ground. Id. Marcel and Doris Gentillon paid taxes
on the home and one acre of improved land. There was no evidence at trial that anyone else had
ever done so. By paying taxes on the home and improved land they satisfY the requirements of
I.C.5-210. R. Ex. A at 86-90. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Martin, 353 N.E.2d 474 (Ind.App.
1976) (Court holding that payment of taxes on the improvements met the statutory tax payment
requirement); Winchell v. Lambert, 304 P.2d 149 (Cal.App.2.Dist.1956).
In 2006, the legislature passed Senate Bill S.B. No. 1311, which increased the required
period for adverse possession to 20 years. Idaho 2006 Session Laws Ch. 158. The change
became effective July 1, 2006. Id. However, when the change took place, Gentillons had already
gained title to the property. A respected legal treatise summarizes the state of the law as follows:
Generally title is acquired by an adverse possession of the land for the prescribed
period of time, or upon the expiration of the period there is created a conclusive
presumption of title. An adverse possession of land for the period of limitation
operates of itself as a grant of all adverse title and interests to the occupants.
Thus, a statute of limitations relating to adverse possession does more than bar an
action by a record owner who has remained quiescent for the statutory period; the
operation of this statute vests title in the adverse possessor, such that upon the
expiration of the limitation period, the adverse claimant becomes possessed of a
vested right or title to the property. No judicial action is necessary to effectuate
transfer.

3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 246 (citations omitted). Numerous courts in other
jurisdictions have so held. Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 410 (Me.,1996) (holding that
"fee title vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the adverse possession period and no
judicial action is necessary to effectuate the transfer."); Connell v. Ellison, 86 A.D.2d 943, 944,
448 N.Y.S.2d 580,581 (N.Y.A.D.,1982); Porter v. Posey, 592 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Mo.App. E.D.
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1979). As such, Gentillons gained title to the home and garden spot in 1996, when the adverse
possession period ran. 3
In 1999, the Gentillons discussed with Darren Leavitt a solution to the house/boundary
line problem he had discovered without understanding that they had already obtained titled to the
property by adverse possession. Tr. 434: 18-435 :6. However, that did not affect that fact that the
property under the house and garden spot was already owned by the Gentillons. The Gentillons'
mistaken belief that the Partnership retained ownership ofthe property did not defeat the title
they gained in 1996 by adverse possession. See Crawford v. French, 633 P.2d 524, 525 -526
(Colo.App., 1981) (where plaintiffs met statutory requirements prior to receiving a revocable
permit from defendants, the permit did not defeat the adverse possession as ownership had
already vested in plaintiffs); La Grange Reorganized School Dist. No. R - VI v. Smith, 312 S. W.2d
135, 139 (Mo.1958) (holding that title gained by adverse possession is not lost by abandonment
or failure to assert title after it is perfected).
Marcel and Doris Gentillon have had title to the home and garden area since 1996. They
intended to pass that title to the Petersons when they sold their property to them. Tr: 373: 15-21.
The district court correctly ruled that title to the garden spot belonged to the Petersons. See

Woodv. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 703, 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1998) (discussing passing prescriptive

3The applicable statute of limitations is the one in place at the time the property was
adversely possessed - not the time period required when the case is tried. See Ford v. Eckert,
406 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind.App., 1980.) (Court applies 20 year standard in effect when alleged
adverse possession occurred, rather than 10 year statute then in affect); Franza v. Olin, 73
A.D.3d 44,897 N.Y.S.2d 804, (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2010)(holding that applicable statute was the
statute in effect at the time title vested in adverse possessor).
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easement to successor in interest and comparing it to adverse possession).
11.

The garden spot was held in trust for the Gentillons by Scott Gentillon
and/or the Partnership.

As discussed above, the consistent theme ofthis court's decisions regarding resulting
trusts is that they where a transfer has occurred under circumstances that raise an inference that
the transferor did not intend the transferee to receive the beneficial interest in the property.
Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44,53,324 P.2d 380, 385 (1958). In the case of the house and

garden spot, there is no question that when Marcel and Doris Gentillon transferred the farm to
Scott Gentillon, no one intended for Scott Gentillon to receive the beneficial interest of the

~

of

the house and the garden area. The behavior of Marcel and Doris Gentillon as well as Scott
Gentillon and the Partnership is consistent with that intent. Scott Gentillon did not pay for the
value of the house or the garden area, and when he sold the property to the Partnership, the
Partnership did not pay for the value of the house and the garden area. Marcel and Doris
Gentillon, and subsequently, the Petersons, have retained possession ofthe property. Because
the circumstances of the sale and the conduct of the parties raises an inference that Scott
Gentillon and the Partnership were never intended to receive the beneficial interest in the house
and the garden area, the trial court correctly ruled that the house and garden area belong to the
Petersons.

g.

The district court erred by not awarding the Gentillons their costs and fees
because, as defendants who avoided all liability, they were a prevailing party
and the costs and fees provisions in the unenforceable contract was
enforceable.

The district court incorrectly declined to name the Gentillons as a prevailing party as to
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the third party claim and erred in not finding that the case was primarily a "boundary line" case
and thus neither attorney's fees provision in the 1998 Agreement nor I.e. 12-120(3) applied.
1.

Gentillons were the prevailing party as to the third party claim.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (1 )(B) defines "prevailing party" and provides in
relevant part as follows:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties.
The Partnership'S Third Party Complaint sought damages for breach of the Agreement for
Exchange of Property in the amount of $200,000. R. at 31. The Partnership apportioned their
damages as follows - $150,000 for the property identified as lot 1 of Section 19 and $50,000 for
the property located in lot 1 of Section 24 (T-10032). R. at 31, ,-r 17. The Third-Party Complaint
also included a claim for specific performance, seeking title to the disputed property, and a claim
for unjust enrichment. R. at 31-33. The Third-Party Complaint was later amended to include a
claim for a resulting trust. R. at 502. The Gentillons answered the third party complaint and,
subsequently, the amended third party complaint, but filed no counterclaims or cross claims
against any party. R. at 45-50, 512-517. Subsequent to the main trial and the trial court's ruling,
there was a supplemental trial to resolve the issue off ownership of the eastern portion of the
house and the "garden spot." The Gentillons prevailed at that trial as well and title to the entire
house and the garden spot was quieted in the Gentillons and subsequently, the Petersons. In
response to the Gentillon's request that they be named a prevailing party the trial court ruled as
follows:
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The Court has considered the arguments of both the Partnership and the
Gentillons and recognizes that they have "prevailed" in some of the issues that
have been raised. However, the Court determines that on the whole, based on the
multiple claims and issues presented and the overall outcome of the case, the
Petersons are the prevailing party.

R. at 776. The Court correctly ruled that the Petersons are the prevailing party, but it erred by not
naming the Gentillons the prevailing party as to the Partnership's third-party claim. Certainly
when parties are successful on some claims and not successful on others, the determination of a
prevailing party, if any, is discretionary to the trial court. However, in this case, the Gentillons
brought no claims and successfully defended against all claims brought by the Partnership.4 This
Court has explained the importance of a successful defense in a prevailing party analysis as
follows:
In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money
judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money
judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court no
worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the value of a successful defense.

Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d
130, 133 (2005); See also Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 204 P .3d 1114 (2009). The trial
court abused its discretion when it declined to name the Gentillons as the prevailing party as to
the Partnership'S third party claim because they successfully avoided all liability in the action.
11.

The trial court erred in not awarding the Gentillons attorney's fees based
on the 1998 Agreement and Ie. 12-120(3).

4The one small success the Partnership had in the case, quieting title to the SW comer of
T-10032, did not result in liability by the Gentillons to the Partnership as the Court simply
ordered the property placed in the Partnership's name. R. at 673-674. It could conceivably result
in liability between Gentillons and the Petersons, but no such claim has been raised in this case.
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The trial court erred by declining to enforce the attorney's fees clause of the 1998
Agreement and I.e. 12-120(3). R. at 774-775. The trial court analyzed Gentillon's request for
attorney's fees as follows:
The ... Gentillons argue that this case is a commercial transaction and therefore
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and the underlying contract which contained an attorney
fees clause both apply. Although it is true that the attorney fees clause in the
underlying contract can still be enforced in a case such as this where the contract
is found the unenforceable, the Court finds that this case is outside the scope of
Idaho code § 12-12(3). The main issue in this case is better classified as a
property ownership dispute or a boundary line dispute, not a commercial
transaction.
R. at 775. The trial court then cited to Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741, 185
P.3d 253 (2008) and Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673,978 P.2d 233 (1999)
for support.
The trial court erred in connecting the applicability ofthe attorney's fees clause ofthe
1998 Agreement with the scope ofI.C. 12-120(3). They are in no way related. The trial court
correctly stated that attorneys fees provisions of contracts are enforceable even when the
underlying contract is not. Ayotte v. Redmon, 110 Idaho 726, 718 P.2d 1164 (1986); O'Connor v.

Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 910, 188 P.3d 846, 854 (2008); Bauchman-Kingston
Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 94, 233 P.3d 18,25 (2008). However the trial court
then failed to determine whether the attorney fee provision of the 1998 Agreement applied to the
Partnership's third party complaint. The provision reads as follows:
9. Attorney's Fees: In the event of any action being necessary to enforce any of
the terms hereof, arising from the breach of any provision hereof, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to receive from the other, all costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such
claim is litigated, and including fees in bankruptcy court or fees on appeal.
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R. at 36-37. The Partnership's third party claim against the Gentillons was, and continues to be,

an attempt to enforce the terms of the 1998 Agreement and includes an assertion that the
Gentillons have breached the terms of the Agreement. As such, the Gentillons are entitled to
attorney's fees as the prevailing party.
Similarly, the trial court erred when it declined to apply I.e. 12-120(3) because it ruled
that this case did not involve a "commercial transaction" - rather it was a dispute regarding
property ownership or a boundary line dispute. R. at 774-775. The mere fact that this case
involved ownership of land and would affect the location of property lines, does not alter that the
fact that the Partnership's claim against the Petersons is premised on the alleged agreements
involved with the Partnership's purchase of farm ground from Scott Gentillon. Idaho Code
120(3) defines "commercial transaction" to include all transactions except those for "personal or
household purposes." The 1998 Agreement was a transaction, and it was not for personal or
household purposes. Idaho Court's have ruled that disputes regarding the purchase of business
properties can be commercial transactions. Farm Credit Bank o/Spokane v. Stevenson, 125
Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994); Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140
Idaho 276,92 P.3d 526 (2004); Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 159 P.3d 851 (2007); Dennett
v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,936 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1997); Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idaho 476,197
P.3d 789 (Ct. App. 2008). The 1998 Agreement and the other alleged agreements that the
Partnership attempted to enforce were commercial transactions. "Where a party alleges the
existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3),
that claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party may recover attorney
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fees even ifno liability under the contract is established." Lexington Heights Development, LLC
v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 P.3d 526,537 (2004) (citations omitted). The trial court
erred in not applying I.C. 12-120(3) because the gravamen of the Partnership's third party claim
against the Gentillons was based on a commercial transaction - its attempt to enforce the alleged
agreements surrounding the Partnership's purchase of the farm ground from Scott Gentillon.

h.

Attorney's Fees on Appeal

Gentillon's are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to both the attorney fee
provision of the 1998 Agreement and I.C. 12-120(3) as the 1998 Agreement consitutted a
commercial transaction. The attorney fee provision of the agreement specially anticipates fees on
appeal:
9. Attorney's Fees: In the event of any action being necessary to enforce any of
the terms hereof, arising from the breach of any provision hereof, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to receive from the other, all costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such
claim is litigated, and including fees in bankruptcy court or fees on appeal.
R. at 36-37. The Partnership continues to argue on appeal that it is entitled to specific

performance of the contract. App. Br. p. 12, Issue A. As such, the Partnership is seeking to
enforce the terms of the 1998 agreement and the attorney fee provision applies.
Gentillons are also entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. 12-120(3) as the
1998 Agreement was a commercial transaction as argued above. Idaho Code 12-120(3) includes
fees incurred on appeal. Wake/urn v. Hagood, --- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 5109535 (2011);
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 546, 82 P.3d 450,458 (2003).
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4. CONCLUSION

Because the district court correctly found the 1998 Agreement was unenforceable, the
Court should affirm the ruling that all remedies under it, including specific performance, are
barred. Because the district court's ruling regarding the nature and location of any resulting trust
were supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Court should affirm that ruling.
However, the Court should reverse the trial courts failure to name the Gentillons the prevailing
party as to the Partnership's third party complaint and award the Gentillons attorney's fees both
at trial and on appeal, pursuant to the terms ofthe 1998 Agreement and I.C. 120(3).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28 th day of November, 2011.

Hyrum rickson
Atto ey for Gentillons
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 28 th day of November, 2011.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered

It .
Kipp L. Manwaring, Esq.
Just Law Office
P.O. Box 50271
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Dwight E. Baker, Esq.
Baker & Harris
266 West Bridge
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
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